DeepTech

In many conversations at KisStartup, an interesting question often arises:
Can urban “green waste” be transformed into a new materials industry?

Releaf Paper offers a compelling example of how a deep-tech startup can build an entire business model around an overlooked resource: fallen leaves.

In most cities around the world, fallen leaves are collected as organic waste and then burned, landfilled, or composted. This process incurs costs for municipalities while generating limited economic value.

Releaf approached the issue from a different perspective:
If fallen leaves contain cellulose just like wood, why not use them to make paper?

From a materials science perspective, fallen leaves still contain a significant amount of cellulose, the primary component used in paper production. However, unlike wood, leaves have a softer structure, contain more impurities, and decompose more easily. As a result, extracting usable fibers requires an entirely different technological process.

This is where Releaf’s core technology comes in. The startup developed a patented process that combines mechanical, thermal, and chemical treatments to extract cellulose from fallen leaves and other forms of green biomass. The process uses familiar industrial equipment such as reactors, grinders, and paper-making machines, but with specialized treatment stages that enable the production of fibers strong enough for paper and packaging.

A notable aspect of Releaf’s technology is that it does not use sulfate, sulfite, or chlorine—chemicals commonly used in traditional paper manufacturing. As a result, the process significantly reduces water and energy consumption while simplifying wastewater treatment.

According to assessments from European Union innovation programs, this technology can reduce CO₂ emissions by approximately 78%, use 15 times less water, and consume three times less electricity compared to conventional wood-based paper production.

In addition, paper produced from leaves can be recycled up to five times or biodegrade within 30–60 days, making it well aligned with circular packaging models.

Beyond Paper: A Green Biomass Processing Platform

From a technological perspective, Releaf is more than a paper company. It is building a green biomass processing platform, capable of transforming materials such as fallen leaves, small branches, agricultural residues, and post-harvest plant stems.

This approach opens the possibility of expanding into multiple applications, including containerboard, tissue products, packaging materials, and potentially bioplastic feedstocks in the future.

The Business Model: Local Waste → Local Packaging

What makes Releaf particularly interesting is its business model.

Instead of building a complex global supply chain like the traditional paper industry, Releaf designed a “local green waste → local packaging” model.

Fallen leaves are collected from local cities, processed into cellulose pulp, and then sold to nearby paper mills or packaging manufacturers. This approach reduces raw material costs while also minimizing logistics expenses.

From a circular economy perspective, the model transforms what used to be a municipal waste management cost into an industrial raw material.

Within this value chain, Releaf generates revenue through multiple streams:

• Selling Releaf Filler, a cellulose filler derived from leaves for paper manufacturers
• Producing leaf-based kraft paper for packaging applications
• Providing sustainable packaging solutions for brands seeking environmentally friendly alternatives

Target customers typically include large companies under strong ESG pressure, such as FMCG, fashion, cosmetics, and e-commerce brands.

In this sense, the value of Releaf lies not only in the material itself, but also in the environmental narrative that brands can communicate to their customers.

A paper bag made from leaves collected in a city park can become a powerful symbol of circular economy thinking.

A Lesson in Innovation

As Europe tightens regulations on single-use plastics and carbon emissions, technologies like Releaf may become an integral part of the next generation of sustainable materials ecosystems.

From a startup perspective, the biggest lesson from Releaf may be simple:

Innovation does not always come from inventing new materials—sometimes it comes from rethinking what we call waste.

In a world striving to reduce emissions and protect natural resources, something as ordinary as fallen leaves—once considered worthless—may become the raw material for a multi-billion-dollar industry.

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KisStartup – Synthesis and Analysis

At many conferences on “entrepreneurial universities,” we often hear inspiring slogans: “turn knowledge into wealth,” “bring research to market,” “spin-off, spin-out”… But a closer look at what is actually happening across Asia reveals a story far more complex—and far more interesting.

Universities are no longer just “technology transfer units” in the traditional sense. They are quietly redefining their role: from institutions focused on teaching and research to hubs of incubation, investment partners, and connective infrastructure linking scientists, businesses, and investors.

This article examines technology commercialization in Asia through the lens of the entrepreneurial university: what universities are doing, why they are choosing this path, and which paradoxes are beginning to surface.

1. From Passive Technology Transfer to the Entrepreneurial University

If we simplify history with a slightly pragmatic view, the first “commercialization wave” at many universities revolved around two activities: filing patents and selling or licensing technologies to companies.

In this model, universities stood in a relatively safe position. They generated knowledge, secured IP, signed transfer contracts, and earned licensing fees. Companies carried the main risk—turning technology into products, building distribution, and accepting the possibility of success or failure—while scientists continued with papers and new research topics.

This model relied on one assumption: that there would always be strong, patient companies willing to take on high-risk research outputs. But in deep-tech fields—semiconductors, new energy, advanced materials, biotech—the path from lab to market is far longer and more uncertain. There is not always a company waiting on the other side.

This gap pushed universities into a new role: not merely handing over technology, but participating directly in startups built around that technology. “Entrepreneurial universities” thus became structural rather than rhetorical:

• Universities co-found companies with research teams, contribute IP as equity, hold shares, and accompany the venture throughout development.
• Spin-off and spin-out frameworks structure the university–founder–investor relationship.
• New internal units emerge: professional TTOs, internal funds, incubators, accelerators, and programs that help scientists become entrepreneurs.

Commercialization is no longer a post-research activity—it becomes a strategic axis.

2. Spin-off vs. Spin-out: More Than Just Terminology

Definitions vary, but in simple terms:

A spin-off is a new company founded to commercialize technology developed within the university. Founders may be faculty, researchers, PhD students, or alumni. The university may license the technology or license + take equity.

A spin-out emphasizes separation from the parent institution. IP transfer is clearly defined, and the university almost always takes equity from the start. Put another way: every spin-out is a type of spin-off, but with tighter ownership and governance ties.

In practice, ecosystems from the UK to Asia use these terms fluidly to refer broadly to “companies born from university technology.” What matters are the mechanisms behind them:

• IP becomes capital, not just a certificate—universities shift from patent owners to partners sharing risk and reward.
• TTOs, R&BD centers, internal funds become strategic units that sit with researchers to discuss business models, fundraising, and contracts.

Culture shifts: “scientist–entrepreneurs” are no longer unusual, and commercialization becomes recognized academic contribution.

3. What Asia Is Actually Doing

Across Asia, several clear “clusters of movement” are emerging: Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, China, and parts of ASEAN.

3.1. Singapore: Universities Wearing the VC Hat

The National University of Singapore (NUS) goes far beyond programs like NUS Enterprise or NUS GRIP. In recent years, it has launched its own deep-tech VC initiative with a commitment of hundreds of millions of SGD.

NUS GRIP serves as both incubator and capital gateway, enabling lab projects to move into real market pathways. Cases like Breathonix—a breath-based COVID-19 testing device—show how ideas travel from lab to IP protection, clinical trials, regulatory engagement, and eventually independent operation.

At NTU, funds like the Nanyang Frontier Fund highlight a key principle: deep-tech cannot leave the lab without early-stage risk-tolerant capital.

3.2. Japan: The UTokyo IPC Architecture

The University of Tokyo offers a more architectural approach. Instead of letting each research group navigate alone, it built a unified platform—UTokyo IPC—with funds, acceleration programs, and collaboration frameworks with local governments and corporates.

Funds like the Academic Startup Acceleration Fund co-invest with external VCs, giving academic startups a clearer runway. This quiet, infrastructure-first strategy is typical of Japan.

3.3. South Korea: The R&DB Layer

Korean universities often build an intermediate R&DB layer managing research portfolios, IP, corporate contracts, and commercialization pathways. This creates a single entity that speaks both “lab language” and “market language,” enabling more solid deep-tech spin-offs in semiconductors, robotics, energy, and AI.

3.4. Hong Kong: HKUST’s Spin-off Portfolio

HKUST takes a portfolio-driven approach, establishing funds like Redbird Innovation Fund and coordinating capital pools of hundreds of millions of HKD. The university manages an end-to-end pipeline—from idea to IP to startup to investment to exit—building a deep-tech brand for the region.

3.5. China: Regional Hubs and Networks

China operates through large networks and regional transfer centers. The China–ASEAN Technology Transfer Center (CATTC) connects hundreds of universities, institutes, and companies, turning commercialization into a regional strategy rather than an institutional one.

3.6. ASEAN: Big Ambitions, Emerging Infrastructure

Most ASEAN universities are still building basic TTOs or piloting first spin-offs, while still unsure how much equity universities should hold for sustainability without stifling the startup.

This is a phase where every decision—policy, ownership, program design—can have long-lasting impact.

4. Internal Changes Within Asian Universities

Across Asia, five major internal shifts are visible:

• Organizational redesign: TTOs, R&BD centers, incubators, and innovation hubs become strategic units rather than administrative ones.
• Capital strategy: Universities adopt investor mindsets—creating internal funds, co-investing with local partners, and accepting early failures as part of deep-tech development.
• Flexible IP rules: Moving away from rigid, high-equity demands toward more investor-friendly, growth-based structures.
• Redefining academic careers: Commercialization efforts are recognized in evaluation, promotion, and awards; universities invest in training and mentoring to reduce friction for scientists.

Regional and global integration: Programs and funds increasingly cross national borders, enabling spin-offs to internationalize early.

5. The Emerging Paradoxes

The entrepreneurial university brings real opportunities—but also real tensions:

• Long-term research vs. short-term commercial pressure
• Equity dilemmas—too much equity scares investors; too little raises internal questions of return
• Fairness and inclusivity—fields less commercially attractive risk being sidelined
• Knowledge for community vs. knowledge for markets—commercial metrics may overshadow the university’s broader societal mission

6. From a Vietnamese Perspective: Where to Begin?

Before targeting numbers of spin-offs, Vietnamese universities must clarify their desired role: a passive transfer unit or an active innovation hub willing to take risks and reorganize?

Only then can we address key questions:

• What kind of TTO can truly bridge the lab–market gap?
• What early-stage capital structures—internal funds, local co-investment—are needed to absorb initial failures?
• What IP policies allow startups to survive, raise capital, and grow while still protecting university interests?
• At what stage should businesses, regulators, and communities be involved—possibly as early as proof-of-concept?

Commercialization should be seen not as a 2–3-year project but a long-term strategic pillar. When the system is well-designed—clear roles, clear rules, clear resources, and clear purpose—spin-offs and spin-outs naturally emerge as consequences, not slogans.

© KisStartup. Any reproduction, citation, or reuse must clearly credit KisStartup.

References

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